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Background: In 2012, the Alaska Section of Epidemiology investigated personnel potentially exposed to a
Brucella suis isolate as it transited through three laboratories.
Methods: We summarize the ﬁrst implementation of the United States Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2013 revised recommendations for monitoring such exposures: (1) risk classiﬁcation; (2)
antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis; (3) serologic monitoring; and (4) symptom surveillance.
Results: Over 30 people were assessed for exposure and subsequently monitored for development of
illness. No cases of laboratory-associated brucellosis occurred. Changes were made to gaps in laboratory
biosafety practices that had been identiﬁed in the investigation.
Conclusion: Achieving full compliance for the precise schedule of serologic monitoring was challenging
and resource intensive for the laboratory performing testing. More reﬁned exposure assessments could
inform decision making for follow-up to maximize likelihood of detecting persons at risk while not
overtaxing resources.
Copyright  2015, Occupational Safety and Health Research Institute. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Laboratory-acquired brucellosis (LAB) cases have been previ-
ously reported in the United States. Anecdotally, clinical labs peri-
odically misidentify or fail to anticipate the presence of Brucella
spp., which creates a risk of episodic exposure at both clinical and
reference laboratories. Brucellae are Gram-negative intracellular
coccobacilli. There are several different species of Brucella, which
have different host speciﬁcities and clinical manifestations.
Brucellae are facultative and grow slowly, which sometimes con-
tributes to their misidentiﬁcation. Brucellosis can be a very debili-
tating and serious disease with symptoms that range in severity
from fevers and body aches to arthritis and endocarditis. Because
symptoms can be vague, brucellosis may not be immediately
diagnosed and people can progress toward chronic brucellosis.lth and Social Services, Division of
astrodale).
upational Safety and Health Resear
y-nc-nd/4.0/).In 2012, an isolate collected from a blood culture taken on
February 8, 2012, was presumptively identiﬁed as Haemophilus spp.
at Laboratory A (an Alaska hospital laboratory) and was forwarded
to Laboratory B (Arctic Investigations Program, a referral labora-
tory) for conﬁrmation. Laboratory A uses a Siemens Microscan
(Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc., Tarrytown, NY, USA) and
Laboratory B uses culture-based methods for bacterial identiﬁca-
tion. On March 6, 2012, the Alaska Section of Epidemiology (SOE)
received a call from Laboratory B that the isolate was suspected as
Brucella spp. Subsequently, Brucella suis was conﬁrmed by Labora-
tory C [Alaska State Public Health Laboratory (ASPHL)] on March 9,
2012. Alaska records an average of one case of brucellosis bienni-
ally. Locally-acquired cases are B. suis biovar 4 and historically have
been associated with contact to infected reindeer or caribou car-
casses [1].Public Health, 3601 C Street, Suite 540, Anchorage, AK, 99503, USA.
ch Institute. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
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rural Alaska who had presented several times to a regional hospital
emergency department (ED) for non-speciﬁc systemic illness of 6e
8weeks’ duration. History and speciﬁc exposures elicited during ED
visits were unremarkable. Following diagnosis and more extensive
interviews, no further discrete exposures were revealed. Brucellosis
typically results from contact with infected animals or animal
products contaminated with the bacteria, with the most commonly
infected animals including sheep, cattle, goats, pigs, and dogs [2].
Although patient occupation did not put him in close contact with
animals, he lived in a rural area where hunting and a subsistence
lifestyle are common. Therefore, patient exposurewas presumed to
be zoonotic.
Secondary exposures to, and ultimately disease from, Brucella
spp. in a laboratory setting have been published [3e9], although no
exposures were speciﬁc to B. suis biovar 4. In 2012, the United States
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had begun
revising recommendations for monitoring such exposures,
including a change to the schedule for serial serologies, and pub-
lished updated prevention strategies to prevent LAB, including: (1)
risk classiﬁcation; (2) antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis
(PEP); (3) serologic monitoring; and (4) symptom surveillance [10].
In this brief report, we describe implementation of these strategies
to manage a laboratory exposure to an isolate of B. suis in Alaska.
2. Materials and methods
We implemented steps published in Traxler et al [10] as follows.
2.1. Risk classiﬁcation
Alaska SOE staff consulted with the CDC Brucella spp. subject
matter experts to develop a plan for assessing exposures of any
affected laboratory workers and implementing a health monitoring
schedule. Staff at each of the three laboratories were administered a
questionnaire to assess speciﬁc practices performed with the
specimen/isolate and the presence of appropriate personal pro-
tective equipment (PPE) or engineering controls in place during
execution of those practices. Examples of risk classiﬁcation criteria
included assessing whether isolates were manipulated on an open
bench without using the appropriate level of biosafety precautions
andwhether other staff werewithin a 1.5meters radius of someone
who was performing those activities [10]. Staff that had been pre-
sent in the laboratories were then classiﬁed as either “High” orTable 1
Summary of serologic testing and postexposure monitoring for persons exposed to a Bru
Laboratory No. of persons assessed Risk categories,
n (%)
Testing* int
A 4 High: 2 (50) 2 staff: By,
Low: 2 (50) 1 staff: By,
1 staff: By,
B 27 High: 4 (15) 1 staff: 0z,
3 staff: 0z,
Low: 23 (85) 13 staff: 0z,
9 staff: 0z,
1 staff: 0z
C 1 Nonex d
* Testing via the BMAT (Brucella spp. micro-agglutination test).
y The ﬁrst follow-up blood draw for persons working in Laboratory Awas in earlyMarch
the baseline or Day 0 interval listed here as 1 is actually 4 weeks from exposure. The ot
z Because the specimen had originally arrived in Laboratory Bw3e4 weeks prior to s
people may actually indicate an additional 3e4 weeks from exposure.
x At Laboratory C, the isolate had been handled in a biological safety cabinet from the
B, baseline.“Low” risk based on their participation in the work-up of the
specimen/isolate or proximity to the work [10]. If specimen
handling occurred with adequate PPE in the biological safety cab-
inet (BSC) as required [11], exposure was classiﬁed as “None”.
Additionally, laboratory practices at each facility were evaluated to
ensure that future exposures could be minimized.
2.2. Antimicrobial PEP
Persons identiﬁed as being at high risk were recommended to
receive the standard dosages of doxycycline (100 mg) twice daily
and rifampin (600 mg) once daily for 3 weeks [10].
2.3. Serologic monitoring
Baseline serum samples as well as follow-up serological testing
from blood collected at 6 weeks, 12 weeks, 18 weeks, and 24 weeks
after last known exposure was recommended. ASPHL evaluated
serum samples using the Brucella spp. micro-agglutination test
(BMAT). In general, testing was batched for efﬁciency, although
time for a single test may take a minimum of 1e2 days.
2.4. Symptom surveillance
Laboratory personnel identiﬁed through the investigation pro-
cess were monitored for development of symptoms and referred to
care and/or testing as appropriate.
3. Results
3.1. Risk classiﬁcation
During the > 4 weeks from specimen collection to ﬁnal conﬁr-
mation of the isolate, a total of 32 people were identiﬁed who had
either worked with the specimen or isolate or had been in the vi-
cinity of the work, with most being associated with Laboratory B
(Table 1).
3.2. Antimicrobial PEP
Six microbiologists who directly participated in the testing of
the specimen or were in the immediate vicinity were identiﬁed as
“High” risk and were recommended to receive the standard pro-
phylaxis. Because of the delay in ﬁnal conﬁrmation and thecella spp. isolate at three laboratories, stratiﬁed by risk
ervals from exposure (wk) Postexposure monitoring
8, 12, 20, 26 Doxycycline/rifampin postexposure antibiotics
Fever watch
12, 26
8, 12
Fever watch
2, 6, 12, 20
6, 12, 20
Doxycycline/rifampin postexposure antibiotics
Fever watch
6, 12, 20
6, 12
Fever watch
Fever watch
,w1month after the specimen had beenmanipulated bymicrobiologists. Therefore,
her intervals were calculated based on the exact interval from exposure.
uspicion of Brucella spp. identiﬁcation, the timing intervals for some of the exposed
outset.
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from exposure to initiation of prophylaxis could not be calculated
for every person, but ranged from 3 days to 31 days. Aside from the
microbiologist mentioned below, the remaining three high-risk
persons completed their courses of prophylaxis.
3.3. Serologic monitoring
Of the total number of exposed staff members from Laboratories
A and B, only 10% (3/31) completed ﬁve serial serologic tests,
although the speciﬁed timing of the blood draws was not followed.
Those three staff represented 100% (2/2) of people with high-risk
exposures at Laboratory A and 25% (1/4) of high-risk exposures at
Laboratory B. In the low-risk groups, 52% of staff (13/25) completed
four tests and 40% (10/25) completed three. Overall, 65% (20/31) of
staff had serology drawn more than 12 weeks’ postexposure.
3.4. Symptom surveillance
At Laboratory B, one high-risk microbiologist reported a fever 3
weeks after exposure and was immediately referred for medical
evaluation. Baseline titers had been negative. Polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) testing of a blood specimen at the time of symptoms
was also negative for brucellosis. This person was taking antibiotic
prophylaxis at the time of fever onset, however, these antibiotics
were discontinued shortly thereafter due to side effects and
because additional broad-spectrum antibiotics were prescribed
from the ED.
Following the incident, several changes were implemented at
both laboratories. At Laboratory A, Gram-negative specimens with
uncertain identiﬁcation were recommended for work-up in a BSC.
At Laboratory B, all Haemophilus inﬂuenzae surveillance cultures
were recommended for work-up inside a BSC until conﬁrmation
was complete. Additionally, a room previously designated for
storage was repurposed into a central receiving area for specimens
in order to eliminate unnecessary trafﬁc in the laboratory. A sign-in
log was instituted for maintenance workers in order to track
entrance into the laboratory area.
4. Discussion
The initial identiﬁcation of the B. suis isolate as H. inﬂuenzae has
been previously documented because of similarities between the
two genera [11e13]. Similarities include the fact that both bacteria
are slow-growing, tiny Gram-negative organisms, however,
Brucellae grow on blood agar and chocolate agar, while
H. inﬂuenzae, only grow on chocolate agar. Other instances where
laboratory exposure occurred have involved misidentiﬁcation of
Brucellae as Psychrobacter spp. or Moraxella spp. [4,710]. This
potential for misidentiﬁcation was incorporated into the revised
practices implemented at both Laboratories A and B. As mentioned,
Laboratory A used a Microscan machine (Siemens, Tarrytown, NY,
USA) for bacterial identiﬁcation and Laboratory B used culture-
based methods, speciﬁcally growth on blood agar plates, Gram
stain consistent with Brucellae, and positive reactions to both ure-
ase and oxidase. Laboratory C used a combination of PCR and
biochemical testing consistent with Laboratory Response Network
procedures at the time of testing.
In this incident, none of the 31 potentially exposed persons had
a detectable titer at the start of the monitoring period and no
seroconversion was documented among those who had serial
serologic testing. For Laboratory A staff, the baseline serum draw
done in March was actually 3e4 weeks after the isolate had been
referred to Laboratory B. Half of the high-risk people had the rec-
ommended ﬁve serial serologic tests, although the precise schedulewas not followed. Most of the people in the low-risk group had at
least four tests. Only 65% had serology drawn after 12 weeks’
postexposure.
Factors inﬂuencing compliance with the timing of serial draws
were not formally assessed. Anecdotally, people reported a
perception of low risk for the exposure and that the timing of serial
draws was inconvenient. The guidelines and schedules were
communicated to affected persons at the ﬁrst blood draw, however,
no speciﬁc constraints or conditions of continued work were made
to compel completion.
Compliance with PEP appeared to be good. Other studies have
noted that poor compliance is often related to occurrence of side
effects [5] or that people may refuse PEP based on low perception of
risk when they are healthy [12,14].
The CDC schedule for serial serological testing of samples was
revised for a few reasons. The new schedule is more evenly spread
over 24 weeks to enable prompt identiﬁcation of infections that
occur after 6-weeks postexposure (the previous schedule was
0 weeks, 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 6 weeks, and 24 weeks) [6]. Also, the
spread may improve mindfulness of laboratory workers and phy-
sicians that brucellosis has a long incubation period, which might
reduce the number of additional exposures associated with a
laboratory-acquired case. Traxler et al [8] found that 21% of
laboratory-acquired brucellosis had onset > 12 weeks after expo-
sure [8]. Finally, one laboratory worker developed brucellosis after
completing a full course of antimicrobial PEP [10]. Although the
reason for PEP failure is unclear, a multipronged approach for dis-
ease prevention is indicated.
The premise behind the serial blood draws is to presage
symptoms of acute infection to allow for rapid institution of
treatment. One study demonstrated detection of a positive titer 2e
5 days before symptom onset [3]. Additionally, persons starting
therapy based on titers before the start of symptoms had milder
symptoms and a shorter illness duration [3]. The timing of symp-
tom onset has varied widely from 1e40 weeks’ postexposure [8],
therefore, developing the optimal schedule to maximize likelihood
of early detection of infection without draining resources is chal-
lenging. Further challenges may occur if testing is batched at a state
or commercial laboratory because the short lead time from sero-
conversion to symptom onset may be negated. Knudsen et al [12]
suggested revising the schedule to eliminate draws at 6 weeks
and 24 weeks and focusing on symptom screening [12]. In Alaska,
the adherence to a ﬁxed schedule was somewhat artiﬁcial because
the exact nature and/or timing of the exposure was unclear and the
proscribed schedule did not necessarily capture true intervals after
exposure.
In previous studies, although high-risk persons not taking PEP
were over nine times more likely than low-risk persons to develop
brucellosis, a proportion of low-risk persons still became ill [8]. In
that report, exposure speciﬁcs about the low-risk persons were not
available. Therefore, one suggestion to reﬁne future exposure as-
sessments would be to incorporate more quantitative measures.
For example, the criteria for low-risk assessment could be nar-
rowed to include a time component (e.g., present for > 30 minutes
after known aerosol-generating procedures) or a larger concentric
ring (e.g., distance > 3 meters from the specimen) to reduce the
overall number of persons classiﬁed as “exposed”. The 2013 criteria
for low-risk assessment consider those persons in the laboratory
> 1.5 meters from manipulation who did not directly participate in
procedures that would constitute a higher risk, such as any aerosol-
generating procedures. However, limited data exist from which to
draw such quantitative measures and exposure to few organisms
can lead to disease [15]. In the Alaska example, sufﬁcient detail was
not collected about individual exposures to assess whether quan-
titative measures could have reduced the number of low-risk
Saf Health Work 2015;6:353e356356persons. Additionally, the species of Brucellae might also be
considered in the decision-making for follow-up in order to
maximize the likelihood of detecting persons at risk while not
overtaxing resources. Admittedly relevant only to a small number
of geographic locations, the lower virulence of B. suis biovar 4 could
be factored into the aggressiveness of postexposure response in the
future. Similarly, there are not enough current data to stratify LAB
risk by species of Brucellae.
Conﬂicts of interest
All authors have no conﬂicts of interest to declare.
References
[1] Alaska Section of Epidemiology Bulletin. Human and Animal Brucellosis in
Alaska. No. 31 [Internet]. 2011 [cited 2015 Apr 22]. Available from: http://
www.epi.alaska.gov/bulletins/docs/b2011_31.pdf.
[2] Ofﬁce of International Epizootics [Internet]. Porcine Brucellosis (Chapter
2.8.5). 2009 [cited 2015 Apr 22]. Available from: http://www.oie.int/
ﬁleadmin/Home/eng/Health_standards/tahm/2.08.05_PORCINE_BRUC.pdf.
[3] Fiori PL, Mastrandrea S, Rappelli P, Cappuccinelli P. Brucella abortus infection
acquired in microbiology laboratories. J Clin Microbiol 2000;38:2005e6.
[4] Robichaud S, Libman M, Behr M, Rubin E. Prevention of laboratory-acquired
brucellosis. Clin Inf Dis 2004;38:119e22.
[5] Maley MW, Kociuba K, Chan RC. Prevention of laboratory-acquired brucel-
losis: signiﬁcant side effects of prophylaxis. Clin Infect Dis 2006;42:433e4.[6] CDC. 2008. Laboratory-acquired brucellosisdIndiana and Minnesota, 2006.
Morb Mort Wkly Rpt MMWR 2006;57:39e42.
[7] Reddy S, Manuel R, Sheridan E, Sadler G, Patel S, Riley P. Brucellosis in the UK:
a risk to laboratory workers? Recommendations for prevention and man-
agement of laboratory exposure. J Clin Pathol 2010;63:90e2.
[8] Traxler RM, Lehman MW, Bosserman EA, Guerra MA, Smith TL. A literature
review of laboratory-acquired brucellosis. J Clin Micro 2013;51:3055e62.
[9] Batchelor BI, Brindle RJ, Gilks GF, Selkon JB. Biochemical mis-identiﬁcation of
Brucella melitensis and subsequent laboratory-acquired infections. J Hosp
Infect 1992;22:159e62.
[10] Traxler RM, Guerra MA, Morrow MG, Haupt T, Morrison J, Saah JR, Smith CG,
Williams C, Fleischauer AT, Lee PA, Stanek D, Trevino-Garrison I, Franklin P,
Oakes P, Hand S, Shadomy SV, Blaney DD, Lehman MW, Benoit TJ,
Stoddard RA, Tiller RV, De BK, Bower W, Smith TL. Review of brucellosis cases
from laboratory exposures in the United States in 2008 to 2011 and improved
strategies for disease prevention. J Clin Micro 2013;51:3132e6.
[11] American Society for Microbiology [Internet]. Sentinel Level Clinical Labora-
tory Guidelines for Suspected Agent of Bioterrorism and Emerging Infectious
Diseases. Revised January 2014. [cited 2015 Apr 22]. Available from: http://
www.asm.org/images/PSAB/Brucella.pdf.
[12] Knudsen A, Kronborg G, Dahl Knudsen J, Lebech AM. Laboratory exposure to
Brucella melitensis in Denmark: a prospective study. J Hosp Infect 2013;83:
237e9.
[13] Barham WB, Church P, Brown JE, Paparello S. Misidentiﬁcation of Brucella
species with use of rapid bacterial identiﬁcation systems. Clin Infect Dis
1993;17:1068e9.
[14] Doker T. Lab-acquired brucellosis in person classiﬁed as high risk and who
declined post-exposure prophylaxis [Internet]. Epi-X posting January 8, 2014.
CDC Epi-X network, limited access. [cited 2015 Apr 22]. Available from:
https://epix2.cdc.gov/v2/Home.aspx (currently referred to as SAMS).
[15] Pappas G, Panagopoulou P, Christou L, Akritidis N. Brucella as a biological
weapon. Cell Mol Life Sci 2006;63:2229e36.
